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Abstract
This paper provides estimates of tobacco price elasticity explicitly distinguishing
between two price effects: the direct effect, reflecting individual reaction to a price
change, and the indirect effect, whereby price influences the individual by changing
community smoking behavior. Canada’s Aboriginal communities are small and se-
cluded, allowing for plausible identification of reference groups on a relatively large
scale. Estimates suggest a 10 percent increase in price decreases daily smoking by 0.91
percentage points (2.11 percent), occasional smoking by 1.24 percentage points (8.27
percent) and average smoking intensity by 0.15 cigarettes per day (2.9 percent). It is
found that the indirect effect almost doubles the response to a change in tobacco prices
over the direct effect alone.
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1 Introduction
Behavioral intervention is often used to achieve a desired population outcome: subsidies
to encourage education; sexual awareness campaigns to avert teen pregnancy; information
campaigns and taxation to improve health. Given the prevalence of these interventions,
it is important that we understand the channels through which they influence behavior.
Social interactions may be an important channel. Consider the effect of a tobacco tax to
discourage smoking. When social interactions are endogenous—in the sense that an individ-
ual’s smoking is positively influenced by the smoking of others—an increase in the price of
tobacco will influence individual smoking through two channels: directly, by making smok-
ing relatively more expensive, and indirectly, by decreasing community smoking rates and
therefore decreasing the marginal utility of smoking. These endogenous social interactions
have broad policy implications. For example, they imply an important aggregation problem:
when only the direct effect is known, we cannot determine the effect of a population inter-
vention by aggregating individual behavior. Further, endogenous social interactions imply
that intervention effectiveness can be improved through designs that take advantage of social
interactions rather than focus only on individual decisions.
In this paper I estimate the effect of price on adult smoking explicitly accounting for the
potential influence of community smoking rates on individual smoking behavior. Separate
estimates are provided for the direct and the total effect of a price change on adult smok-
ing, with the difference being the indirect effect. Previous studies attempting to estimate
endogenous social influences on a large scale have been limited in their ability to identify a
plausible reference group and control for endogenous neighbourhood selection (see Evans et
al. 1992). In this respect Canada’s Aboriginal communities provide a unique context. Small
populations and tight knit communities mean that individuals are likely to be aware of the
conspicuous activities, such as smoking, of their fellow community members. This “reference
group” assumption is a critical component to incorporating social interactions into estimation
(see Manski, 1993, 2000). Community selection can be treated as exogenously determined
through birth or marriage, and barriers to moving into the communities and incentives to
remain in the communities result in low mobility. Further, changes in policies exempting
Aboriginals from provincial sales tax provide a source of large and exogenous variation in
tobacco prices.
The empirical strategy exploits a repeated cross section of 95 communities and 17,720
individuals created from the 1991 and 2001 waves of the Aboriginal Peoples Survey, a post-
census survey administered by Statistics Canada. This provides a rich community-level
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panel structure to control for unobservables, such as variation in preferences across commu-
nities arising from differences in historical and spiritual attachment to tobacco. Changes to
provincial policies regarding tax exemptions in Aboriginal communities provide exogenous
variation in tobacco prices. This study provides the first unified documentation of these
policies and the resulting between-period price changes (in constant dollars) are as large as
40 percent.
Several important contributions are made to the existing literature. First, I provide sep-
arate estimates of the direct and the total effect of a tobacco tax on adult smoking. For
daily smoking the estimated direct effect of a price increase is approximately half the to-
tal effect, suggesting that endogenous social interactions significantly influence the observed
behavioral response to a price change. Relatively few studies consider how estimated price
elasticity is affected by endogenous social interactions. Of those that do, Sen and Wirjanto
(2009) find that social interactions do not significantly impact elasticity estimates, while
Auld (2005) and Powell et al. (2009) find that excluding controls for social interactions from
the regression leads to a larger estimate of the price elasticity. While this latter finding is
consistent with social interactions having a multiplier effect on price elasticities, a shortcom-
ing of these studies is that the direct price elasticity (estimated by controlling for reference
group smoking) is compared to an elasticity estimated from a potentially misspecified model
and it is not clear that the total price effect on smoking behavior is accurately estimated.
I explicitly account the direct and indirect effects to provide an identified estimate of total
price elasticity.
Second, I estimate the effect of endogenous social interactions for adults at the community
level. I find they are important. A 10 percentage point increase in community smoking rates
increases the probability a given individual smokes by 4.7 percentage points. A 10 percentage
point increase in daily smokers increases the probability a given individual smokes daily by
7.9 percentage points. This builds on previous studies that examine how youth smoking
is impacted by peer smoking in the same school or classroom (for example see Powell et
al. (2005), Krauth (2007), Soetevent and Kooreman (2007), and Fletcher (2010).) This
research has resulted in a range of estimated endogenous effects for youth, but it is unclear
whether these peer effects carry over to the behavior of adults. Cutler and Glaeser (2007)
find that the probability an adult smokes increases 40 percent if their spouse smokes. When
they expand their peer group to individuals in the same metropolitan area, age cohort, and
education level there is no significant group effect. These results may suggest that peers are
important to youth but not adult smoking. Because Aboriginal communities are small and
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secluded I am able to identify a feasible reference group for each individual that is larger
than the household or classroom, but smaller than a metropolitan area. My findings suggest
that the importance of social interactions on behavior does not go away, or even diminish,
in adulthood, nor do they weaken in groups of almost 1,000.
Third, I provide the first estimates of tobacco price elasticity for Canada’s Aboriginal
communities. For adults, a 10 percent increase in price is estimated to lead to a 0.91 per-
centage point (2.1 percent over 2001) decrease in daily smoking, a 1.24 percentage point (8.3
percent over 2001) decrease in occasional smoking, and decreases average smoking intensity
by 0.15 cigarettes per day (2.9 percent over 2001). This is consistent with a large litera-
ture estimating the importance of price in smoking. Typical estimates of price elasticity are
between -0.5 and -1.7 for youth initiation (Powell et al., 2009) but substantially lower in
adult populations. Franz (2008), for example, estimates an adult price elasticity of -0.19 and
Cutler and Glaeser (2007) find price does not significantly affect adult smoking. The esti-
mates provided in this study are important for health policy as the exemption of Aboriginal
communities from provincial sales taxes, which make up between 29 and 50 percent of the
final price on tobacco, is often cited to explain high Aboriginal smoking rates.
Aboriginal People’s Survey data allow me to address several novel issues in the literature.
However, these data come with some limitations. Estimation utilizes variation in community
aggregates over time. The use of sample analogs in place of the true aggregates and the fact
that community aggregates tend to change very slowly means the the fixed effects estimates
produce large standard errors and instruments which, by conventional measures, are weak.
This is most problematic for occasional smoking where the empirical strategy does not appear
to successfully identify the structural equation. Steps are taken to address these issues, such
as calculation of weak instrument robust confidence intervals for the endogenous regressors
and the inclusion of several sensitively checks. However, these issues highlight the need for
reliable data collection, both with respect to the estimation of social effects and with respect
to Aboriginal communities in Canada.
The communities examined in this study are First Nations reserves, land that is set aside
for exclusive use by registered Indians. “Aboriginal Canadian” refers to three broadly defined
groups: First Nations, Me´tis and Inuit. As this study will focus largely on First Nations,
who are the primary residents of reserves, this term will be adopted for the remainder of the
paper. However, it should be kept in mind that a small portion of reserve residents claim
Me´tis and Inuit identity (1.15 and 0.05 percent in the data used here). Over one million
Canadians claim First Nations identity of which 40 percent are estimated to live on-reserve
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(Statistics Canada, 2006). First Nations represent the fastest growing population in Canada,
with an estimated growth rate more than five times that of the non-Aboriginal population
(Statistics Canada, 2005). Surprisingly, despite often dire economic and health conditions
and the existence of remarkably similar communities in the United States, Australia and
other countries, these communities have received little attention in the economics literature.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I introduce a simple model
of individual tobacco demand that incorporates tobacco use by others in the community,
based on the linear-in-means model of social interactions. This model is used to explicitly
show the multiplier effect arising from endogenous social interactions. I then discuss the
empirical estimation strategy for the reduced form and structural equations. The reduced
form estimates yield price elasticity which reflects the total effect of a price change and
structural estimates yield price elasticity which reflects the direct effect of a price change.
The structural equation is estimated using community high school graduation rates and a
measure of perceived community problems reported by community members to instrument
the endogenous community smoking rates. Cross-community variation in the change in
these characteristics over time identifies the endogenous structural parameters. This strategy
yields precise and robust estimates of structural parameters with respect to daily smoking
and smoking intensity. In Section 3, I discuss the data used in the empirical estimation
and provide a brief description of the evidence supporting the underlying reference group
assumption. The results of the empirical estimation are presented in Section 4 followed by an
analysis of the robustness of the estimates in Section 5. Robustness checks include relaxing
the assumption of instrument exogeneity following the methods proposed by Conley, Hansen
and Rossi (2012). Finally, Section 6 concludes with a brief discussion of the results.
2 A model of tobacco demand
In this study I think about the influence that community smoking has on the smoking
decisions of individual community members. There are a number of reasons to think that
this is a realistic characterization of behavior. Tobacco use may be an informal mechanism
to signal social identity or group membership (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). Individuals may
inform their opinions on the health consequences of smoking based on observed smoking of
others. Addicted smokers may increase the quantity of tobacco they consume, or decrease
the desire to quit, when surrounded by other smokers. Alternatively, to the extent that
smokers are altruistic, non-smokers being offended by tobacco use may provide an incentive
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for smokers to reduce consumption or initiate efforts to quit. The communities examined here
are relatively small in population and have a limited number of locations, such as recreation
centers, community halls, or restaurants, for residents to gather outside of the home. For
this reason, the tobacco use an individual observes will reflect the mean tobacco use in the
community.
With this in mind, individual utility from tobacco use is specified as a function of mean
tobacco use in the community. To provide a framework for thinking about how community
behavior and prices influence smoking behavior I adopt a quasi-linear utility specification.1
The utility for individual i is given by:
U(Cigt, sigt, Egt[s]) = ηCigt +
[
Aigt + αEgt[s]−
1
2
sigt
]
sigt (1)
Cigt and sigt are the consumption of a composite commodity and tobacco for individual i
in group g at time t. Egt[s] is the mean level of tobacco consumption in community g.
The parameter η captures the constant marginal utility from consumption of the composite
commodity to individual i. Aigt is a function of observable and unobservable determinants
of individual smoking behavior. Social interactions are captured by αEgt[s], the marginal
utility of sigt attributable to mean smoking rates in the community. Therefore when mean
tobacco use in the community increases by one unit, i’s marginal utility increases at the
constant rate α. Following Manski (1993), α is referred to as the endogenous social effect.
Each community consists of a sufficient number of individuals such that no single indi-
vidual’s behavior has a significant influence on Egt[s], and all individuals take Egt[s] as given.
Each chooses consumption over sigt and Cigt to maximize Eq. (1) subject to their budget
constraint, Cigt + Pgtsigt ≥ Yigt, where Pgt is the real price of tobacco faced by community g
at time t, and Yigt is i’s real income. Price of the composite commodity is normalized to 1.
This results in the following first order condition (focusing on the interior solution):
sigt = Aigt + αEgt[s]− ηPgt (2)
This condition states that individual i will choose sigt such that the marginal benefit from
consuming sigt, Aigt + αEgt[s] − sigt, is equal to the marginal cost, ηPgt. Notice that ηPgt
reflects the utility forgone by consuming Pgt fewer units of C for every unit of s.
In equilibrium all individuals choose according to Eq. (2). We can solve for Egt[s] by
1This is similar to the utility specification used in Glaeser et al. (2003).
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taking expectations on both sides of Eq. (2):
Egt[s] =
Egt[A]
(1− α)
−
ηPgt
(1− α)
,
and substituting back into Eq. (2) to solve for the demand based on exogenous variables:
s⋆igt = Aigt +
αEgt[A]
(1− α)
− ηPgt −
αηPgt
(1− α)
(3)
= Aigt +
αEgt[A]
(1− α)
−
ηPgt
(1− α)
(4)
Eq. (3) explicitly shows the two channels through which price influences behavior when
endogenous social interactions are non-zero. The third term on the right-hand-side is the
direct effect of price on s⋆igt. A unit increase in Pgt increases the marginal (utility) cost of
each unit of sigt by η. The fourth term is the indirect effect of price that works through
the reference level Egt[s]. Because every individual in community g is affected by the price
increase Egt[s] declines. This creates a feedback effect as all individuals further decrease
sigt in response to the decreases in Egt[s]. The equilibrium magnitude of this indirect effect
is a αη/(1 − α) unit decrease in s⋆igt for a unit increase in price.
2 The sum of these two
effects corresponds to the price coefficient in (4). This highlights the previously mentioned
aggregation problem; in the presence of endogenous social interactions the effect of price on
group behavior cannot be determined by aggregating the direct effect of price on individual
behavior.
2.1 Identification
The composite variable Aigt from Eq. (4) is specified as the sum of observable and unob-
servable influences on the outcome:
Aigt = X
′
igtβ1 + Z
′
igtβ2 + Egt [X]
′ θ1 + I
′
gtθ2 + δg + ψt + ǫigt
Egt [ǫigt] = 0, Egt
[
ǫ2igt
]
= σǫg.
(5)
The 1× l vector Zigt and 1× k vector Xigt both include exogenous characteristics specific to
individual i. Importantly, Zigt represents characteristics that exclusively influence individual
i and Xigt represents characteristics that, in aggregate, may directly influence the preferences
2Notice that αη/(1− α) is equivalent to the infinite sum λ = η
∑∞
n=0 α
n.
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of others in the community. The aggregate influence is captured by the inclusion of Egt [X],
a vector of the mean values of Xigt within community g. Igt is a vector of other observable
community characteristics that impact individual tobacco preferences. Unobserved factors
that influence preferences for tobacco are captured by δg+ψt+ ǫigt, where δg is unobservable
factors corresponding to the community, ψt is common unobserved factors over time, and ǫigt
is unobservable factors corresponding to the individual. The following assumptions are made
with respect to the distribution of unobservables: 1) δg is constant over the time period under
consideration; 2) conditional on Xigt, Zigt and Igt, ǫigt is independently but not identically
distributed across communities. The first assumption means that community level fixed
effects can be used to control for δg
3. The second assumption allows that disturbances may
be correlated within communities and standard errors need to be clustered by community
when estimating.
Coefficients are interpreted following Manski (1993). The l × 1 and k × 1 vectors of
coefficients, β1 and β2, correspond to the private effect of each exogenous variable on the
cigarette consumption of individual i. For example, an individual’s age may directly impact
propensity to smoke. In addition to the endogenous social effect, α from Eq. (2), there
is a second social effect, known as the contextual effect, captured by the k × 1 and m × 1
vectors θ1 and θ2. The contextual effect captures the influence on individual tobacco use of
observable community characteristics. For example, living in a community with high levels of
income inequality may place stress on all community members (Wilkenson and Pickett, 2007)
which leads to greater tobacco use (Rahkonen et al, 2005). Therefore, changes in income
inequality will effectively coordinate changes in tobacco use for individuals in the community.
δg corresponds to Manski’s correlated effects. In the current context, a correlated effect is
present if permanent differences in traditional and spiritual use of tobacco across communities
lead to differences in mean smoking behavior. As correlated effects are assumed constant
over time they will be captured by including a community fixed effect.
This model of tobacco demand results in two equations from which price elasticity can
be estimated. Substituting Eq. (5) into Eq. (4) yields the following reduced form estimating
3While difficult to provide evidence for or against this assumption, it seems intuitively likely to hold.
For example, unobserved correlated effects may arise through traditional beliefs and values with respect to
tobacco. Traditional and spiritual beliefs are generally slow to change and the 10 years considered here
would represent a relatively short period. Another, potentially more concerning, source may be unobserved
community health interventions. In Section 5 I discuss and test this channel.
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equation:
sigt = X
′
igtβ1+Z
′
igtβ2+Egt [X]
′ αβ1 + θ1
1− α
+Egt [Z]
′ αβ2
1− α
+ I ′gt
θ2
1− α
+
ηPgt
1− α
+
δg + ψt
1− α
+ ǫigt.
(6)
Notice that the coefficients for variables that affect the entire group all contain the social
multiplier, 1/(1− α).
The second estimating equation uses the two-stage strategy outlined by Graham and
Hahn (2005) to estimate the structural equation directly. In the first stage the elements
of Egt [Z] are used as excluded instruments to estimate Egt [s]. In the second stage the
correspondent predicted values of Êgt [s] to estimate (4) directly. This estimation strategy
is summarized by the following equations:
Êgt [s] = Egt [X]
′ β1 + θ1
1− α
+ Egt [Z]
′ β2
1− α
+ I ′gt
θ2
1− α
+
ηPgt
1− α
+
δg + ψt
1− α
(7)
sigt = X
′
igtβ1 + Z
′
igtβ2 + αÊgt [s] + Egt [X]
′ θ1 + I
′
gtθ2 + ηPgt + δg + ψt + ǫigt. (8)
In this strategy, the between-community variation in the change in community averages for
Zigt over time identifies the effect of community tobacco use on individual tobacco use (α in
Eq. (8)).
Notice that the extent to which Eq. (6) and Eq. (8) yield different estimates of price
elasticity depends on the magnitude of α. If α = 0 then the coefficients associated with
price for the two equations will be approximately equivalent. If 0 < α < 1, then the price
coefficient for Eq. (6) will be strictly larger than the price coefficient for Eq. (8). Further,
the two price coefficients will differ by 1/(1− α) where α is estimated directly in Eq. (8).
2.2 Empirical application
The data—discussed in greater detail in Section 3—used to estimate equations (6) and (8) is a
randomly drawn sample from two time periods (1991 and 2001) and 95 distinct communities.
Xigt includes a quadratic age term, a sex indicator, household size, marital status, family
and respondent income (in $100,000 increments), employment status, and current student
status. Igt includes the within-community standard deviation of personal income.
Zigt includes two variables for which the absence of a contextual effect is plausible. The
first is high-school graduation status. Previous work has shown that education has a causal
effect on individual smoking. Across a number of different smoking outcomes de Walque
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(2007) estimates the causal effect of education to be close to that obtained from OLS. There
are a number of explanations for this relationship. Education may change the perceived
value of the future, or change the way an individual discounts the future. More educated
individuals may be better able to process information that is disseminated about the health
risks of tobacco (de Walque, 2010). Attending school may increase the probability of being
exposed to an anti-smoking intervention, although the effectiveness of these interventions
is questionable (for example see Nutbeam et al, 1993). Conditioning on own education, I
assume that an individual’s tobacco use is influenced by the community rate of high school
graduation only indirectly through aggregate tobacco use. This assumption is violated if,
independent of their own tobacco use, more educated community members are more likely
to support anti-smoking programs and such programs have a measurable effect. In this
case, estimates will falsely attribute the correlation between individual tobacco use and the
community high school graduation rate to endogenous social interactions rather than to
the unobserved policy interventions. This is unlikely to be the case as, relative to other
health and economic concerns, smoking is not viewed as problematic in these communities.
The 1991 Aboriginal Peoples Survey asks respondents to identify the three most serious
community health issues. Only 0.2 percent of respondents identify smoking in this list.4
Compare this to 11.1 percent who identify psychological health, 13.3 percent who identify
alcohol, drug and solvent abuse, and 25.6 percent who identify diabetes. Further, of the few
respondents who identify smoking, there is not a significant correlation with education.
The second variable in Zigt is a community problem index. The community problem index
is constructed based on the answers to seven binary response questions regarding whether the
respondent thought various social issues where a problem in the community (none referring to
smoking).5 The index is the proportion of these questions for which an affirmative response is
given. The community problem index captures individual perceptions of community health.
If perceiving a greater number of problems leads to greater stress, a positive relationship
between the index and tobacco is expected. However, conditioning on one’s own perception
of the social problems in the community the perception of other community members should
only effect the individual’s tobacco use if it effects aggregate tobacco use.
The identification strategy uses between-community variation in the change in commu-
nity averages for Zigt between the two time periods—variation in Eg2001 [Z]−Eg1991 [Z]—to
4The 1991 Aboriginal Peoples Survey included questions (D3 3A1–D3 3A3) asking the respondent to
choose from a list of 26+“other” health concerns the three most serious community health problems.
5The seven questions ask if the respondent believes suicide, unemployment, family violence, rape, sexual
abuse, drug abuse or alcohol abuse are problems in the community.
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identify the effect of community tobacco use on individual tobacco use (α in Eq. (8)). The
between-community means and standard deviations for the two variables in Eg2001 [Z] −
Eg1991 [Z] are summarized in the far right column of Table 1. The intuition underlying this
exclusion restriction is captured by the following thought experiment: Consider a moving a
randomly chosen individual from his current community to a hypothetical community which
is observably identical, including tobacco use, except that the high-school graduation rate
is 10 percent higher. The exclusion restriction means that the individual will not have a
different pattern of tobacco use in the second community than in the first. The sensitivity
of estimates to deviations form the exclusion restriction on Zigt is examined in Section 5.
Sample analogs for Egt [X] and Egt [Z] are constructed using the population weights pro-
vided in the survey and all observations available for each community.6 Summary statistics
for these variables are provided in Table 1.
Table 1
3 Data
The primary data for this study are drawn from the 1991 and 2001 waves of the Aborig-
inal Peoples Survey (APS), a post-census survey administered by Statistics Canada. The
confidential micro-data are accessed through the Statistics Canada’s Research Data Center.
Communities are identified by unique census sub-division codes. I restrict the sample to
communities that are sampled in both the 1991 and 2001 APS and exclude communities
with less than 45 observations in each period7. The result is a total of 95 First Nations
6The use of sample analogs may bias estimates toward zero. To see this write Eq. (6) in sample analogs:
sigt = X
′
igtβ1 + Z
′
igtβ2 + X¯
′
gt
αβ1 + θ1
1− α
+ Z¯ ′gt
αβ2
1− α
+ I ′gt
αθ2
1− α
+
ηPgt
1− α
+
δg + ψt
1− α
+ uigt
where
uigt =
(
Egt[X]− X¯gt
) αβ1 + θ1
1− α
+
(
Egt[Z]− Z¯gt
) αβ2
1− α
+ ǫigt = e
X
gt + e
Z
gt + ǫigt
It is assumed that measurement error in the explanatory variables is uncorrelated with the random error
component: E
[
eXgt, ǫigt
]
= 0 and E
[
eZgt, ǫigt
]
= 0. This implies that the sample is randomly selected (see
Section 3 for a discussion of data sampling). Further I assume that individual characteristics are measured
without error. Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) discuss the additional complications faced with selection
bias and error-in-variables. I use a split-sample IV estimation approach (as in Auld (2011)) to address the
attenuation bias resulting from random error. Unfortunately this strategy results in dramatically larger
standard errors, likely due to the relatively small community samples, and is not reported. Therefore,
coefficient estimates for community aggregates should be interpreted as under-estimating the true effect.
7These restrictions result in a decrease from an initial APS sample of 181 and 123 communities and
25,122 and 45,710 observations, to a sample of 11,090 and 12,910 observations observations, in 1991 and
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reserves8 consisting of 24,400 individuals (an average 23 percent sample for each community
based on 2001 census populations) from which sample analogs for community means are
calculated. For regression estimation, data is restricted to respondents between the ages of
18 and 60, dropping 4,890 observations. Further, observations missing any outcome or con-
trol variables, a total of 1,390, are omitted9. The final regression sample consists of 17,720
individual observations.
The APS is not a representative sample of First Nations reserves in Canada. Survey
participation is voluntary and conditional on Census participation. As many reserves do not
participate in the Census the APS under-represents communities in Ontario, Quebec and
Eastern Canada. All long form (form 2B) 1991 Census respondents who reported at least
one Aboriginal origin10 received the 1991 APS (Statistics Canada, 1995). The response rate
for the 1991 APS is 87 percent. Likewise, long form (form 2D for on-reserve respondents)
2001 Census respondents who either reported Aboriginal ancestry (question 17) or identified
themselves as Aboriginal (questions 18, 20 or 21) are targeted for the 2001 wave of the
APS with an on-reserve response rate of 88 percent (Statistics Canada, 2003). Due to cost
considerations, the 2001 survey sampled 50 to 55 percent of the participating communities
in each province, beginning with the largest. In the case of British Columbia, where there
are many small reserves, less than 50 percent of the communities are surveyed.
3.1 Tobacco use in First Nations reserves
Tobacco use summary statistics are presented in Table 2. Smoking rates are high in these
communities relative to the Canadian average (12 percent) and the population of Aboriginal
Canadians living off-reserve (48 percent).11 60 and 58 percent of respondents indicated
that they smoked cigarettes in the 1991 and 2001 surveys. Daily cigarette smoking increased
slightly between surveys, from 41 to 43 percent of respondents. Smoking intensity (measured
by the number of cigarettes smoked per day) decreased by about two cigarettes per day
between 1991 and 2001.
2001 respectively. For further details please consult the supplementary appendix
8A complete list of all these communities can be found in the Appendix.
9Please consult the supplementary appendix for more details and sensitivity analysis with respect to these
observations.
10Aboriginal origin is defined as having identified ethnic origin as North American Indian, Me´tis or Inuit
(Census form question 15), or as registered under the Indian Act (Census form question 16.)
11The Canadian average reflects the 2003 rate reported by Health Canada (2009), the off-reserve average
reflects the 2001 rate for Southern Canada reported by Statistics Canada on their website: http://www.
statcan.gc.ca/pub/82-003-x/2009004/article/10934/figures/fig2-eng.htm.
11
Similar to non-Aboriginal communities, the average age of initiation for tobacco use is
16 years. Smokers who successfully quit do so at an average age of 31, and the average
daily smoker has been smoking for 17.5 years. Finally, in the 1991 survey, 69 percent of
respondents (both smokers and non-smokers) indicate that at least one smoker, other than
themselves, lives in their household.
Table 2
3.2 Community level referencing
A priori identification of the reference group for each individual observation is critical to the
incorporation of social effects in empirical estimation (Manski, 1993, 2000). In this study it is
assumed that an individual’s reference group is other individuals in the same community. To
show that this is a reasonable assumption, in this section the geographic, social and economic
structure of the communities in this sample is discussed. The reference group assumption is
based on the fact that these communities are relatively small, secluded, and self-sufficient.
Migration in and out of the communities is also relatively low.
Many of the communities, particularly those in the North, are located in relatively un-
populated regions of Canada and a significant distance from major city centers. These
communities are relatively self-sufficient. Based on a 2003 report, 74 percent have schools
and recreation centers, 80 percent have health care centers, and 60 and 48 percent have fire
and police services.12 In 1991 50 percent of actively employed respondents worked in the
community, a number that increased to 78 percent in 2001 (see Table 1).13
To live on a First Nations reserve an individual must be a member of the First Nations
band which governs the reserve. Sections 6 and 10 of the Indian Act outline the criteria
band membership. In practice, band membership is most often gained through birth or
marriage(Assembly of First Nations, 2008).14 Although economic opportunities are few
on many reserves, there are non-trivial benefits to living on a reserve in terms of housing
provision (Alcantara and Flanagan, 2002) and tax exemptions (Gardner-O’Toole, 1992). The
barriers to entry and relative benefits of reserve life likely explain the low movement into and
12The respective infrastructure for each community is reported in the Appendix. All information is found
at the Government of Canada’s Aboriginal Canada Portal website: http://www.aboriginalcanada.gc.ca/
acp/site.nsf/eng/index.html .
13The increase in on-reserve employment is likely, in part, a response to 1995 changes to income tax
exemptions. The changes required that tax-exempt exempt employment take place on reserve.
14Prior to the 1985 amendments to the Indian Act, status by birth required the father be a registered
Indian (Assembly of First Nations, 2008).
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out of these communities, as reflected in the APS data (Table 2). The number of respondents
who report having lived in the community their entire life was 46 percent in 1991 and 69
percent in 2001. Only 10 and 18 percent of respondents, for 1991 and 2001, report having
lived outside of the community within five years of the survey.
A selection bias will result if aggregate tobacco consumption influences an individual’s
decision to remain on or move off their reserve. Individuals with strong anti-smoking sen-
timents may choose to move off a reserve with high smoking rates, but stay on a reserve
with low smoking rates. This will lead to a spurious correlation between aggregate tobacco
consumption and individual tobacco consumption attributable to endogenous community
selection rather than endogenous social effects. My estimation of endogenous social effects
assumes that this problem is sufficiently insignificant. This assumption is supported by a
relatively constant (or increasing) population size in all reserves over the time period of in-
terest and the low mobility rates reported in Table 2. Further, a study conducted by the
Institute of Urban Studies (2003) found that, for families that moved from reserves to the
city of Winnipeg, 90 percent of respondents cited family, employment, and education as
being their primary reasons for moving. Only 1.3 percent of respondents cited alcohol and
substance abuse as the primary motivate for leaving the reserve. Given this, the number of
relocations due to tobacco use is likely very small.
3.3 Tobacco taxation in First Nations reserves
Section 87 of the Indian Act exempts all Status Indians from provincial sales taxes levied
on tobacco (Gardner-O’Toole, 1992). To qualify for exemption, tobacco products must be
purchased on a reserve, and the purchaser must present proof of Status. Some provinces
impose a quota on the amount of tobacco an individual can purchase over a defined period
(Physicians for a Smoke Free Canada, 2007), but these quotas are large relative to the needs
of individual smokers and will not be considered in the analysis.15 Status Indians are not
exempt from federal excise taxes on tobacco (Physicians for a Smoke Free Canada, 2007).
Tobacco price information for individual communities between 1991 and 2001 is not
available. Therefore, tobacco prices in this study reflect the average price by year and
province for Status Indians purchasing on a reserve (the exception is the Kamloops reserve
which implemented a First Nations Tax.) Prices, summarized in Table 3, are constructed
using average provincial prices and information on the implementation of tax exemptions.
15For example, Alberta imposes a 4-carton, or 800 cigarettes, per week per individual quota.
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Exogenous price variation comes from three sources. The first is federal excise tax re-
ductions in the early 1990s, which were larger in the Eastern provinces than the Western
provinces. Second, band councils have the authority to implement a First Nations Tax (FNT)
in the communities they oversee. In 1998 the Kamloops Band became one of only 11 bands
in Canada (and the only in this sample) to implement a 7 percent FNT on tobacco products
sold on the Kamloops reserve16 (Physicians for a Smoke Free Canada, 2007). Finally, varia-
tion comes from differences in how provincial tax exemptions are implemented. The province
of Saskatchewan did not recognize tax exemptions until March 30, 2000 (Saskatchewan De-
partment of Finance, 2010), which resulted in a 39 percent decrease in the point-of-sale
price of tobacco in Saskatchewan between 1999 and 2000. For communities in the province
of Manitoba and the Lennox Island reserve in Prince Edward Island (included in the sam-
ple), taxes are applied at the retail level and reimbursed to local First Nations band councils
(Physicians for a Smoke Free Canada, 2007). As the interest of this study is the point-of-sale
price, these communities are treated as fully reflecting the provincial tobacco tax.
Table 3
Tobacco prices on-reserve are never greater than tobacco prices off-reserve. However, due
to changes in provincial tobacco tax rates between 1991 and 2001, prices tend to be more
volatile off-reserve. Notable exceptions are in Manitoba, where on and off-reserve tobacco
prices move in unison, and in Saskatchewan, where the 2000 exemption of provincial tobacco
taxes on-reserve resulted in a large overall decrease in tobacco prices over this period.
Because cigarette prices in a given year are constant across all reserves within a province
(Kamloops being the exception), I must assume that price changes are uncorrelated with any
other unobservable factors that changed at the provincial level and influenced tobacco use.
For example, if a decrease in tobacco prices is met with an aggressive Aboriginal tobacco
education campaign implemented in a province, the influence of price on smoking behavior
may be under-estimated.
4 Results
Eq. (6) and Eq. (8) are estimated for four outcomes. Three binary outcomes are considered—
smoking participation, daily smoking, and occasional smoking (conditional on not being a
16The sample analyzed in this study contains the Kamloops 1 community. More information on the
Kamloops FNT can be found at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/gi/notice92a/notice92a-e.html.
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daily smoker)—and smoking intensity, as reflected by number of cigarettes consumed per day.
As all models are estimated linearly, binary outcomes are interpreted as linear probability
models.17 In addition to providing a robustness check, these four outcomes provide unique
information with respect to the effect of price changes.
4.1 Reduced form estimates
In Table 4 I report the results for the reduced form estimates. Regressions include community
fixed effects, a 2001-year dummy variable, and community level clustering of standard errors.
Table 4
4.1.1 Tobacco prices
As tobacco is an addictive good the effect of a price change on tobacco demand can be
expected to be smaller in the the short run than in the long run (for example see Gilleskie
and Strumpf, 2005). The price variation used in this study comes from policy changes
taking place between 1991 and 2001. Therefore, the estimated price effects are interpreted
as average long-run effects across these communities.
The estimated effect of a change in tobacco prices on tobacco use is economically non-
trivial. A 10 percent increase in the price of tobacco is predicted to decrease smoking
participation by 1.26 percentage points. This estimate is consistent with tobacco price
elasticities estimated for non-Aboriginal population (for example see Ding (2004), Sen and
Wirjanto (2009) and Franz (2008)). Estimates suggest that occasional smokers are more
price sensitive than daily smokers; a 10 percent price increase reduces daily smoking by 0.91
percentage points and occasional smoking by 1.24 percentage points. This result is consistent
with intuition, as occasional smoking is less likely than daily smoking to be associated with
addiction. Finally, price estimates for smoking intensity suggest that a 10 percent increase
in the price of tobacco will reduce average tobacco consumption by approximately 0.15
cigarettes per day.
17By specifying a linear-in-means framework I am able to precisely interpret estimated coefficient from
the different equations. Binary outcome models have also been estimated using a probit specification. As
expected, estimated marginal effects between the probit and linear estimates are very similar (see Angrist
and Pischke (2008, 103–107) for a discussion on this property).
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4.1.2 Individual characteristics
High school graduation and the community problem index are included in Zit in Eq. (6)
and Eq. (8). To be valid instruments for community smoking they must be significantly
correlated with smoking at the individual level. Consistent with previous studies that show a
strong negative relationship between education and tobacco use (de Walque, 2007; Cutler and
Glaeser, 2007), First Nations adults who graduate high school are 11.1 percentage points less
likely to smoke than those who leave high school without completion. Further, estimates
are large and statistically significant across all outcomes; high school graduates are 10.7
percentage points less likely to smoke daily, 7.0 percentage points less likely to be occasional
smokers, and smoke on average 2.28 fewer cigarettes per day.
The community problem index is positively correlated with daily smoking and smoking
intensity; individuals who identify one more social problem (a 0.14 unit increase in the index)
are 0.49 percentage points more likely to be a daily smoker and smoke 0.15 more cigarettes
per day. The coefficients estimated for smoking participation and occasional smoking are
economically small and statistically insignificant. These estimates are consistent with theo-
ries that tobacco is used as a coping mechanism in stressful circumstances (Rahkonen et al.,
2005). The community problem index reflects individual perceptions of community health
(these perceptions may or may not reflect reality). It is reasonable that individuals who
perceive the community in which they live as having more social problems, and therefore a
higher community problem index, feel more stress and anxiety.
Other individual characteristics, included in Xit in Eq. (6) and Eq. (8), are consistent
with the findings reported in studies for non-Aboriginal populations. The influence of de-
mographic characteristics, marital status and income on adult tobacco use is very similar to
what is found using the Current Population Survey (Cutler and Glaeser, 2007). The age-
quadratic indicates that smoking participation and daily smoking increase until age 25 and
decrease afterwards. The propensity for occasional smoking ends much earlier, increasing
until age 18 and decreasing thereafter. Controlling for other factors, males are 1.8 percent-
age points less likely to be daily smokers, but consume one cigarette more per day, then
their female counterparts. Married individuals are 8.1 percentage points less likely to smoke
than individuals never married and smoke three-quarters of a cigarette less per day. The
coefficients for household and individual income are negative and statistically significant but
economically small. At best, a ten-thousand dollar increase in personal income reduces to-
bacco use by one percentage point. Similarly, unemployed individuals are 4.6 percentage
points more likely to be smokers than those not in the labour force. The consistency of these
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estimates with previous work is reassuring.
Within many communities tobacco is considered a sacred plant. Therefore, individuals
who are engaged in traditional Aboriginal culture may be more likely to disregard warnings
about the dangers of smoking (see McKennitt (2005) for a discussion). However, ceremonial
use involves consuming relatively small amounts of tobacco and is unlikely to lead to abuse.
Estimates are consistent with this reasoning; individuals who speak a traditional Aboriginal
language are 2.1 percentage points more likely to identify themselves as smokers, however,
this is due only to an increase in occasional smoking. Individuals who speak a traditional
language are no more likely than non-speakers to be daily smokers.
4.1.3 Community characteristics
A significant coefficient associated with the community means suggest that either an en-
dogenous social effect or a contextual effect is present. Many of the coefficient estimates
associated with community means are statistically insignificant but have an economically
meaningful magnitude. This may be the result of low variation across communities and time
leading to imprecise estimates or attenuation bias arising from the use of sample analogues
in place of community means. Consider comparing two observationally equivalent individ-
uals living in communities that are identical in every way except in one the proportion of
residents under 20 years of age is 10 percentage points higher (and proportion of residents
over 60 is 10 percentage points lower). The individual in the younger community is 11.4 per-
centage points more likely than the individual in the older community to be an occasional
smoker. A 10 percentage point increase in community speaking of a traditional Aboriginal
language increases the probability a given individual will be an occasional smoker by 2.26
percentage points but has an economically small and negative effect on daily smoking and
smoking intensity.
Indicators of community health, specifically the mean community problem index and the
standard deviation of community income, have an interesting interpretation. Conditioning
on an individual’s community problem index, an increase in the mean community problem
index increases the probability a given individual will be a daily smoker. A mean increase of
one more problem identified (increasing the index by 0.14) increases the probability of daily
tobacco use by 3.38 percentage points. A ten-thousand dollar increase in the standard devia-
tion of community income increases the probability an individual smokes by 7.96 percentage
points.
It is worth noting that, under the assumption that α ≥ 0, if the coefficient for a variable
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in Egt[X] or Egt[Z] is a different sign than the coefficient for the corresponding variable
in Xigt or Zigt a contextual effect must be present. This is the case with being married
or common law (as opposed to single). The private effect of being married is negative
and statistically significant but the effect of community marriage is positive and large in
magnitude. Therefore, it is likely the case that for marriage θ > 0. Notice that for high school
graduation and the community problem index the estimated coefficients for the community
aggregates are the same sign as the estimated coefficients for the individual characteristic.
4.2 Structural estimates
The preferred estimates for Eq. (8) are reported in Table 5. As predicted by the model,
estimates of β1 and β2 change very little relative to Table 4 and, in the interest of space,
are excluded from Table 5. Eq. (8) is estimated using a two-stage generalized method of
moments procedure (Stata’s XTIVREG2 command) using community means of high school
graduation and the community problem index as excluded instruments. To increase the
instrument strength, for smoking participation and smoking intensity, only the stronger of
the two instruments is used in the regression.18 Estimates for alternative specifications are
discussed in Section 5 and reported in Table 6.
Following Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) I calculate confidence bounds for α that are
robust to weak instruments (CH bounds henceforth). This involves estimating the following
series of equations:
s˜igt − α0E˜gt [s] = E˜gt [Z]
′
γ + υigt α0 ∈ [α, α¯] ,
where [α, α¯] is predetermined and a tilde indicates that all other regressors in Eq. (8) have
been partialled out. A test of γ = 0 is equivalent to a test of α = α0 and this test is
independent of instrument strength (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2008). The resulting CH
bounds for α are defined by the upper and lower bounds on the set of all α0 for which the null
hypothesis of γ = 0 fails to be rejected (the corresponding F-test is calculated using robust
standard errors clustered by community). For each outcome this procedure is implemented
by varying α0 is between -4.0 and 4.0 by increments of 0.005. CH bounds are reported in
braces in Table 5.
18Following Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp.205–15). When instruments are relatively weak, the bias arising
from weak instruments is inversely related to the number of weak instruments, with the just identified
case being approximately unbiased. Please see the supplementary appendix for a discussion and estimates
including all instruments.
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Table 5
4.2.1 Tobacco prices
The direct effect of a 10 percent increase in the price of tobacco is predicted to decrease
smoking participation by 0.79 percentage points. This is a little more than half the magnitude
of the estimated total effect in Table 4. A similar pattern is observed for daily smoking and
smoking intensity. The direct effect of a 10 percent price increase is estimated to decrease
daily smoking by 0.49 percentage points and to decrease smoking intensity by about 1.17
cigarettes per day. This suggests the importance of endogenous social effects in observed
outcomes: endogenous social effects increase the effect of a change in price relative to the
direct effect alone.
The estimated direct price elasticity for occasional smoking is slightly larger than that re-
ported in Table 4. This can be attributed to the fact that community high school graduation
rates and the average community problem index have very low first-stage explanatory power.
As a result, structural estimates for this outcome remain unidentified under this strategy.
Notice that the estimated value for αˆ for this outcome is negative, and the weak-instrument
bounds extend to the lower limit (-4.00).
4.2.2 Endogenous social effects
Coefficients corresponding to community aggregates for each of the outcomes are interpreted
as endogenous social effects, parameter α from Eq. (2). With the exception of occasional
smoking, estimates of α are large in magnitude. Consider moving a randomly chosen indi-
vidual from their current community to a hypothetical community, identical in every respect
except smoking participation is 10 percent higher. The move will increase that individual’s
propensity to smoke by 4.74 percentage points. This is consistent with endogenous social
effects estimated for tobacco use by Cutler and Glaeser (2007) and Powell et al. (2005), but
larger than those reported in Krauth (2007). However, estimates for smoking participation
are not statistically significant under conventional standard errors, and the CH bounds are
large and skewed left, suggesting that αˆ cannot be confidently distinguished from zero.
Estimates for daily smoking and smoking intensity suggest that α is large. 10 percentage
point increase in the proportion of daily smokers increase the probability an individual
smokes daily by 7.85 percentage points. Following an exogenous increase in average smoking
intensity of one cigarette per day individual smoking intensity is expected to increase by
0.85 cigarettes per day. The instruments for these two outcomes are relatively strong (the
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first stage F-stats for excluded instruments are 5.36 for daily smoking and 7.69 for smoking
intensity) and point estimates are precise. For daily smoking, the lower value of the CH
bound suggests that α = 0.33, which is a non-trivial magnitude. For smoking intensity the
CH bounds are wider, with a lower value of α = 0.25, but still suggest the point estimate
statistically differs from zero and is non-trivial in magnitude.
Estimates for occasional and daily smoking are over-identified. In these cases Hansen’s J
is used to test the null hypothesis that exclusionary restrictions are valid. The corresponding
p-values, reported at the bottom of Table 5, fail to reject the validity of the exclusionary
restrictions. However, as this test is low in power, and relies on the exclusion restriction
being valid for at least one instrument, the exclusion restrictions are further examined in
Section 5.
5 Robustness
The above analysis relies on two key identifying assumptions: 1) unobservable correlated
effects are constant over time and 2) there is no contextual effect associated with high school
graduation or perceived community problems. In this section I interrogate these assumptions
and consider alternative specifications for the estimation of Eq. (8).
Table 6
If community health interventions, unobserved within this study, took place between
1991 and 2001, then the first assumption above may be violated and result in confounded
estimates. Such an intervention does not need to address smoking directly to be problematic.
Diabetes is a serious health concern in these communities. In this sample, 11.1 percent
of 2001 respondents stated they have doctor diagnosed diabetes and 25.6 percent of 1991
respondents identified diabetes as a serious health problem in their community (0.2 percent
identified smoking). An intervention targeting diabetes may include a smoking cessation
component. If so, a decrease in the prevalence of diabetes (or other complicating factors
such as obesity) over time will be correlated with a decrease in community smoking. To
account for this I include in Igt the estimated rate of doctor diagnosed diabetes and obesity
(identified by a body mass index greater than 30) in the preferred regression.19 The resulting
ηˆ and αˆ, presented in Panel A of Table 6, change little from previous estimates. For smoking
participation, αˆ increases to 0.484 with a, still insignificant, CH bound of {-0.410, 0.969}.
19Regressions with diabetes and obesity separately yield similar results.
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Estimates for daily smoking and smoking intensity are very close to those in Table 5. This
suggests that any confounding effect arising from unobserved health interventions over time
does not seriously affect the estimates in Table 5.
Estimates using alternative specifications for Eq. (8) are presented in panels B and C
of Table 6. In Panel B only speaking of traditional language and the standard deviation of
community income are included as aggregates in both the first and second stage. This is
equivalent to imposing the strong assumption that all remaining community aggregates have
no contextual effects and can be used as excluded instruments.20 Under this specification
αˆ decreases for smoking participation, daily smoking and smoking intensity. For occasional
smoking αˆ is positive and of a reasonable magnitude (although the bounds on this estimate
remain large). Further, the estimated price effect for occasional smoking is now half the size
of the estimated total effect, consistent with the underlying model. However, the first stage
instruments remain too weak, and the underlying assumptions are too strong, to be confident
in this result. In Panel C estimates are reported for regressions that exclude a number of
the community aggregates are from the first and second stage. This addresses the concern
that collinearity, arising from the use of many community aggregates, is leading to very
imprecise estimates. For all outcomes I drop the proportion of males, average household size,
average family and respondent income and proportion unemployed. Further, for smoking
participation and smoking intensity I also drop proportion employed.21 Relative to the
estimates reported in Table 5, there is only a slight decrease in the point estimates.22 I
conclude that the main findings of this study are not sensitive to the alternative specifications
reported in Table 6.
Finally, I turn to examining the second assumption mentioned above. Conley, Hansen
and Rossi (2012) provide a method of testing the sensitivity of structural estimates to small
deviations from the exclusion restriction implied by this assumption. Intuitively, this involves
assigning a predetermined value for the contextual effect, θ0, of the instrument of concern
20Including all of these aggregates as instruments leads to very low first stage F-statistics. Therefore,
following Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp.205–15), only the original instruments are included in the first
stage.
21The p-values corresponding to an F-test of the joint significance of the dropped variables in the first (sec-
ond) stage regression are 0.21(0.39) for smoking participation, 0.78(0.70) for occasional smoking, 0.41(0.47)
for daily smoking, and 0.70(0.30) for smoking intensity.
22It should be cautioned that the standard errors of these estimates have not been corrected for variable
pre-selection (Wong, 1997). This correction will likely lead to confidence intervals wider than those reported
in Panel C.
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and re-estimating the second stage structural equation:
sigt−Egt [Z]
′ θ0 = X
′
igtβ1+Z
′
igtβ2+αÊgt [s]+Egt [X]
′ θ1+I
′
gtθ2+ηPgt+δg+ψt+ǫigt θ0 ∈
[
θ, θ¯
]
.
Repeating this exercise for each θ0 ∈
[
θ, θ¯
]
will yield a corresponding set estimate for α.
The confidence interval for this set is the union of confidence intervals for each α(θ0). If
contextual effects associated with Zigt are important then αˆ will be sensitive to changing
values of θ0.
To define the bounds on
[
θ, θ¯
]
I assume that the magnitude of the contextual effect
associated with the instrument is no more than half the magnitude of the private effect
associated with the corresponding variable. For example, for smoking participation the
private effect associated with high school graduation is -0.11. Therefore, the maximum
magnitude the contextual effect of the community high school graduation rate is |0.06|.
Further, for high school graduation, I assume that the contextual effect is negative. This
implies that the direct effect of a 10 percent change in the high school graduation rates is
roughly the same magnitude as the estimated direct effect of a 10 percent increase in the
price of tobacco. For the community problem index I consider both positive and negative
bounds symmetric about zero.
Figure 1
The results of the sensitivity analysis are reported in Figure 1. For each of the binary
outcomes I report the analysis for the high school graduation rate only, for smoking intensity
I report the results for the community problem index. In the figures to the left and right I
report estimates for α and η respectively over different values of θ0. In each figure, θ0 is on
the horizontal axis, the solid line depicts point estimates, the dashed lines depict 90 percent
asymptotic confidence interval, the fine dashed lines depict 90 CH bounds (with a minimum
lower bound of -4.0).
Imposing a negative contextual effect associated with the high school rate leads to a
smaller point estimate for the endogenous social effect. For smoking participation, with
a contextual effect in the set [−0.06, 0], the corresponding point estimate set is [0.21, 0.47].
While this set suggests a point estimate that is economically non-trivial, both the asymptotic
confidence intervals and CH bounds suggest that zero cannot statistically be excluded from
the estimates. The estimated endogenous social effect for daily smoking is robust to this
sensitivity test. For a contextual effect in the set [−0.05, 0] point estimates are [0.72, 0.78]
with 90 percent CH bounds of {0.23, 0.97}. Notice that even at the lower CH bound, the
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implied endogenous social effect for daily smoking is relatively large. For smoking inten-
sity, with the community problem index contextual effect varying between [−0.50, 0.50], the
point estimates remain large in magnitude, [0.73, 0.97], and the corresponding CH bounds,
{0.02, 1.42}, widen but remain positive.
Estimates of the direct price elasticity, η, are relatively stable to this sensitivity test. For
smoking participation the set of point estimates is [−0.11,−0.08] with a confidence interval
of (−0.21,−0.002). The point estimate set for daily smoking is narrow, [−0.053,−0.049], and
statistically significant with a confidence interval of (−0.09,−0.01). For smoking intensity
estimates are also stable with point estimates between [−1.23,−1.11] and a corresponding
confidence interval of (−2.31,−0.15).
The sensitivity analysis suggests that the structural estimates for Eq. (8) are reasonably
robust to deviations in the exclusion restrictions.
6 Conclusions
Using the 1991 and 2001 waves of the Aboriginal Peoples Survey I create a repeated cross-
section of Canadian First Nations reserves and use it to analyze smoking behavior. Three
important contributions are made: i) I estimate the direct and the total effect of a tobacco
tax on smoking. ii) I estimate the community level impact of endogenous social interactions
on adult smoking. iii) I provide the the first estimates of tobacco price elasticity in Canada’s
First Nations reserves.
Does ignoring social effects when estimating price elasticity affect results? To answer this
question consider an estimating Eq. (8) under the assumption that α = 0. When θ1 = θ2 = 0,
implying observable community characteristics are also ignored, the estimated price effects
for smoking participation, occasional smoking, daily smoking and smoking intensity are -
0.067, -0.047, -0.075 and -1.026. When observable community characteristics in Egt[X] and
Igt, but not Egt[Z] are included the respective estimates are -0.103, -0.140, -0.053, and -1.088.
Notice that for smoking participation, daily smoking and occasional smoking estimates are
consistent with the direct effect. From a policy perspective it is the total effect that is of
interest. This illustrates the importance of explicitly modelling the underlying theory to
ensure that we know which price effect is being estimated.
Previous policy studies suggest that the tobacco tax is an important instrument to ad-
dress high rates of tobacco consumption on First Nations reserves. For example, Samji and
Wardman (2009) hypothesize that a 7 percent First Nations Tax (FNT) will reduce smoking
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rates by 2.4 percent and provincial tax rate (50 percent) will reduce smoking rates by 22.5
percent.23 My estimates suggest that the effect of tax policy on adult tobacco consumption
will be about half this size: relative to 2001 levels, smoking participation rates for Aboriginal
adults will decrease by 1.52 percent (0.88 percentage points) following a 7 percent FNT and
10.86 percent (6.30 percentage points) following a provincial tax. Further, a tax will have a
greater proportional effect on occasional smoking than daily smoking. A 50 percent tax will
decrease daily smoking by 10.58 percent and occasional smoking by 41.33 percent from 2001
levels.
The ability to identify an individual’s community allows me to identify a feasible ref-
erence group and to provide meaningful information about the relationship between policy
intervention and social interactions. For smoking participation, daily smoking and smoking
intensity I find that social interactions result in a non-trivial increase in the negative influence
of price on adult tobacco use over the direct effect alone (given the results reported in Table
4 and Table 5.) Further, some interesting contextual effects are identified for occasional
tobacco use. In particular, greater traditional language use, both by individuals and for the
community aggregate, increases the probability of occasional smoking. One interpretation of
this is that ties to traditional culture lead to ceremonial use of tobacco. Interestingly, there
is no corresponding relationship with daily tobacco use.
The results of this study have relevance beyond smoking on First Nations reserves. One
may worry endogenous social effects are larger in these communities than in non-Aboriginal
populations. This concern can be mitigated by noting that the estimated total price effect
is similar in magnitude to estimates from non-Aboriginal adult populations. If endogenous
social effects are larger, then the direct price effect must be weaker in First Nations reserves
than in non-Aboriginal communities. This seems unlikely, given that on-reserve household
income is well below the Canadian average. Further, the analysis in this study will apply to
any socially influenced good or behavior, such as obesity and low physical activity, drug and
alcohol use, or education and labour force participation.
The importance of endogenous social interactions needs to be considered in policy design.
First, policy interventions that are applied to a sub-group within the population will have
meaningful spillovers to the larger population. For example, the availability of quit-smoking
assistance in the work place will impact smoking in the larger community. Second, broadly
applied interventions will be more effective (i.e. have a larger “multiplier”) than narrowly
23The predicted effect of tobacco taxation in Samji and Wardman (2009) is based on an elasticity estimated
for non-Aboriginal populations by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
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focused interventions. Third, when only the direct effect of an intervention is know, as
may be the case in trial studies randomized across individuals, we cannot determine the
effectiveness of a policy by aggregating individual behavior. Estimates of the endogenous
social effect provide a mechanism for adjusting from randomized trial to large-scale policy.
Further research is warranted to address this study’s limitations. Much of the estimation
relies on the variation in community aggregates over time. Because sample analogs are used
in place of the true aggregates, corresponding coefficient estimates are prone to attenuation
bias as a result of error-in-variables. Further, community aggregates tend to change very
slowly, limiting the within-variation available to exploit. Therefore, the fixed effects estimates
produce large standard errors and instruments which, by conventional measures, are weak.
This is most problematic for occasional smoking where the empirical strategy does not appear
to successfully identify the structural equation. A strong instrument, preferably generated
through a randomized-control field study, will significantly improve the analyses.
The study of Canada’s on-reserve First Nations population is limited by access to reliable
data. Waves of the APS that follow the 2001 survey (2006, 2011) are limited to individuals
living off-reserve.24 Continued collection of information from these communities will greatly
improve our ability to study and make policy recommendations with respect to this important
segment of the Canadian population.
Likewise, the empirical identification of social effects more generally is limited by data
availability. Surveys that include questions directed at identifying reference group behaviors
are vital to move this research forward. Given the importance of this information for health
and social policy research, ensuring such information is collected in national data should be
high priority.
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Table 1: Demographic, income and labour summary statistics
1991 2001 1991–2001
Mean SDW SDB N Mean SDW SDB N ∆ SD∆
Xigt
Age 34.75 15.97 2.25 11,090 36.09 15.78 2.36 12,920 1.58 1.81
Males 0.52 0.50 0.05 11,090 0.50 0.50 0.04 12,930 0.00 0.06
Household size 5.55 2.57 0.98 11,090 4.89 2.29 0.84 12,770 -0.64 0.64
Married 0.88 0.92 0.20 11,090 0.75 0.89 0.18 12,770 0.01 0.04
Family income 20,875 18,296 8,176 11,090 24,864 23,187 9,373 12,770 4,400 6,126
Personal income 9,048 10,161 1,957 11,090 12,784 13,429 3,179 12,770 3,736 2,781
Employed 0.31 0.45 0.09 11,030 0.39 0.48 0.10 12,570 0.08 0.10
Unemployed 0.15 0.35 0.07 11,030 0.12 0.31 0.05 12,570 -0.03 0.08
Speaks a trad. language 0.84 0.23 0.21 10,930 0.80 0.31 0.20 12,890 -0.04 0.12
Attending School 0.17 0.37 0.05 11,090 0.12 0.33 0.04 12,470 -0.01 0.07
Zigt
High school grad. 0.15 0.34 0.08 9,570 0.23 0.41 0.09 11,390 0.09 0.07
Com. problem index 0.51 0.26 0.11 10,680 0.61 0.27 0.10 12,520 0.10 0.11
SDW and SDB are standard deviations within and between communities, ∆ is the average change in mean
community values between 1991 and 2001 and SD∆ is the between community standard deviation in the
change between 1991 and 2001. 95 communities covered. Population weights used in all calculations. N,
the number of observations, is rounded for confidentiality requirements.
Table 2: Tobacco use and mobility summary statistics
1991 2001
Mean SDW SDB N Mean SDW SDB N
Tobacco use
Smokers 0.60 0.48 0.10 10,840 0.58 0.48 0.11 12,480
Daily smokers 0.41 0.48 0.11 10,840 0.43 0.48 0.12 12,480
Cig. per day (daily) 14.78 9.26 3.30 4,509 12.07 7.20 2.41 5,320
Cig. per day (occasional) 4.98 3.93 1.28 1,790
Age started 16.05 4.80 1.09 5,240
Age stopped 31.47 13.31 3.39 1,900
Years smoked 17.48 12.45 3.26 5,240
Other smokers in household 0.69 0.45 0.12 10,811
Mobility
Lived on reserve entire life 0.46 0.46 0.196 10,829 0.69 0.44 0.131 12,840
Lived off reserve past 5 years 0.10 0.28 0.061 11,081 0.18 0.365 0.098 10,560
Currently works on reserve 0.50 0.37 0.310 5,715 0.78 0.34 0.202 5,710
SDW and SDB are standard deviations for within and between communities. 95 communities covered.
Population weights used in all calculations. N, the number of observations, is rounded for confidentiality
requirements.
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Table 3: Cigarette prices in survey years
Province 1991 2001 % Change Communities
Newfoundland 35.32 32.42 -8.21 1
Prince Edward Island 52.08 44.48 -14.59 2
Nova Scotia 37.50 31.47 -16.08 3
New Brunswick 39.36 35.33 -10.24 1
Quebec 33.53 26.87 -19.86 3
Ontario 36.11 28.86 -20.08 7
Manitoba 53.27 51.28 -3.74 14
Saskatchewan 50.88 30.73 -39.60 30
Alberta 31.85 28.36 -10.96 12
British Columbia 30.40 28.15 -7.40 21
Kamloops 30.40 30.12 -0.92 1
Prices reflect the real price of 200 cigarettes for Status Indians purchasing on reserve. Nominal prices are
adjusted using provincial consumer price index (2001 dollars.)
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Table 4: Reduced form equation estimates
Smoking Occasional Daily Cigarettes
participation smoking smoking per. day
log(Cigarette prices) -0.126*** -0.124* -0.091 -1.526
(-0.195, -0.056) (-0.228, -0.020) (-0.187, 0.005) (-3.408, 0.356)
Individual characteris-
tics
Age 0.011*** 0.005* 0.009*** 0.412***
(0.007, 0.015) (0.000, 0.010) (0.005, 0.013) (0.330, 0.495)
Age-squared/100 -0.022*** -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.574***
(-0.027, -0.017) (-0.020, -0.007) (-0.022, -0.012) (-0.674, -0.475)
Male -0.014 -0.004 -0.018* 1.009***
(-0.029, 0.001) (-0.020, 0.012) (-0.033, -0.002) (0.670, 1.348)
Household size 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.002 0.002***
(0.002, 0.008) (0.004, 0.011) (-0.001, 0.006) (-0.074, 0.078)
Divorced/sept./wid. 0.026 -0.008 0.036** 1.255***
(-0.000, 0.052) (-0.039, 0.022) (0.010, 0.063) (0.588, 1.922)
Married -0.081*** -0.075*** -0.057*** -0.790***
(-0.098, -0.065) (-0.096, -0.054) (-0.072, -0.041) (-1.187, -0.394)
Family income‡ -0.090*** -0.109*** -0.048** -0.981**
(-0.125, -0.056) (-0.148, -0.069) (-0.078, -0.017) (-1.631, -0.331)
Respondent income‡ -0.106*** -0.092** -0.060* -2.084**
(-0.161, -0.051) (-0.154, -0.029) (-0.118, -0.002) (-3.418, -0.749)
Employed -0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.047
(-0.016, 0.015) (-0.023, 0.015) (-0.017, 0.018) (-0.282, 0.376)
Unemployed 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.030*** 0.622**
(0.029, 0.063) (0.019, 0.068) (0.013, 0.048) (0.167, 1.077)
Trad. language 0.021** 0.037*** -0.000 -0.273
(0.004, 0.037) (0.016, 0.059) (-0.017, 0.016) (-0.635, 0.089)
Attending school -0.017 -0.023 -0.010 -1.101***
(-0.044, 0.010) (-0.059, 0.013) (-0.037, 0.016) (-1.630, -0.573)
High school grad. -0.111*** -0.070*** -0.107*** -2.283***
(-0.130, -0.093) (-0.089, -0.050) (-0.124, -0.089) (-2.745, -1.822)
Com. problem index 0.005 -0.022 0.035** 1.101***
(-0.017, 0.028) (-0.051, 0.007) (0.008, 0.062) (0.552, 1.649)
Community means
SD of income‡ 0.796** 0.275 0.880** 13.624
(0.161, 1.431) (-0.631, 1.182) (0.151, 1.609) (-0.383, 27.631)
Age < 20yrs 0.425 1.136** -0.157 -1.273
(-0.248, 1.098) (0.322, 1.949) (-1.025, 0.710) (-4.584, 2.038)
Age 20–29yrs 0.009 0.531 -0.350 13.916
(-0.553, 0.571) (-0.195, 1.257) (-1.034, 0.333) (-6.282, 34.114)
Age 30–39yrs -0.009 0.236 -0.173 9.634
(-0.487, 0.470) (-0.390, 0.862) (-0.718, 0.373) (-8.150, 27.419)
Age 40–49yrs 0.105 0.178 0.059 8.973
(-0.502, 0.712) (-0.525, 0.880) (-0.646, 0.765) (-7.653, 25.600)
Age 50–59yrs -0.064 -0.112 -0.049 9.927
(-0.552, 0.424) (-0.716, 0.493) (-0.545, 0.446) (-5.704, 25.558)
Males 0.236 0.371 0.108 5.631
(-0.152, 0.624) (-0.186, 0.928) (-0.410, 0.627) (-7.885, 19.148)
Household size -0.013 -0.232 -0.006 -0.271
(-0.040, 0.014) (-0.057, 0.011) (-0.039, 0.027) (-1.147, 0.604)
Divorced/separ./wid. 0.307 0.328 0.198 7.632
(-0.129, 0.744) (-0.197, 0.854) (-0.356, 0.752) (-1.406, 16.669)
Married/common law 0.222 0.249 0.183 5.532
(-0.010, 0.455) (-0.080, 0.578) (-0.103, 0.469) (-0.605, 11.670)
Family income‡ 0.133 0.117 0.084 6.128
(-0.215, 0.480) (-0.346, 0.579) (-0.344, 0.512) (-2.989, 15.244)
Respondent income‡ -0.875* -0.382 -0.961 -17.894
(-1.734, -0.015) (-1.665, 0.901) (-2.021, 0.099) (-38.960, 3.172)
Continued on next page
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Table 4 – Continued from previous page
Smoking Occasional Daily Cigarettes
participation smoking smoking per. day
Employed 0.045 -0.198 0.203 0.823
(-0.144, 0.234) (-0.459, 0.064) (-0.004, 0.411) (-4.115, 5.760)
Unemployed -0.157 -0.088 -0.204 -6.270*
(-0.472, 0.159) (-0.430, 0.255) (-0.550, 0.141) (-11.582, -0.957)
Trad. language 0.097 0.259** -0.039 -1.273
(-0.021, 0.215) (0.068, 0.451) (-0.167, 0.089) (-4.584, 2.038)
Attending school -0.221 -0.534** 0.053 0.168
(-0.453, 0.012) (-0.876, -0.192) (-0.278, 0.384) (-6.521, 6.857)
High school grad. -0.108 -0.060 -0.170 -1.547
(-0.327, 0.111) (-0.385, 0.266) (-0.430, 0.089) (-5.949, 2.854)
Com. problem index 0.132 0.021 0.199** 3.483*
(-0.002, 0.265) (-0.185, 0.226) (0.045, 0.353) (0.550, 6.416)
Observations 17,720 9,590 17,720 14,635
Adjusted R-squared 4.38% 4.29% 2.33% 3.43%
***,**,* Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 90% confidence intervals, based on robust standard
errors adjusted for community level clustering, are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include
community fixed effects and year effects. Family income is net of respondent’s income. Cigarette prices
reflect the point-of-sale price of 200 cigarettes for Status Indians purchasing on reserve. Nominal monetary
variables are adjusted using the provincial consumer price index (2001 dollars.)
‡Income variables in 100,000 dollar values.
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Table 5: Structural equation estimates
Smoking Occasional Daily Cigarettes
participation smoking smoking per. day
log(Cigarette prices) -0.079* -0.142 -0.049** -1.167*
(-0.155, -0.003) (-0.313, 0.029) (-0.087, -0.011) (-2.160, -0.173)
Community means
Com. smoking rate† 0.474
(-0.075, 1.023)
{-0.405, 0.995}
Com. smoking rate (occ.)† -0.301
(-2.472, 1.869)
{-4.000, 1.020}
Com. smoking rate (daily)† 0.785***
(0.555, 1.015)
{0.330, 0.965}
Com. smoking intensity† 0.850***
(0.458, 1.242)
{0.250, 1.255}
SD of income‡ 0.514 0.246 0.379** 5.187
(-0.057, 1.085) (-0.885, 1.377) (0.085, 0.672) (-3.510, 13.884)
Age < 20yrs 0.225 1.270 -0.104 12.164**
(-0.223, 0.672) (-0.287, 2.826) (-0.393, 0.184) (2.750, 21.578)
Age 20–29yrs -0.164 0.631*** -0.360 5.703
(-0.580, 0.253) (-0.601, 1.863) (-0.580, -0.139) (-2.630, 14.036)
Age 30–39yrs -0.121 0.325 -0.192 3.583
(-0.511, 0.269) (-0.640, 1.290) (-0.404, 0.021) (-5.273, 12.438)
Age 40–49yrs 0.066 0.172 -0.034 3.548
(-0.334, 0.467) (-0.608, 0.951) (-0.278, 0.210) (-5.208, 12.304)
Age 50–59yrs 0.051 -0.077 0.113 6.422
(-0.241, 0.342) (-0.722, 0.567) (-0.084, 0.310) (-2.058, 14.903)
Males 0.080 0.416 -0.110 -2.008
(-0.213, 0.373) (-0.321, 1.154) (-0.305, 0.084) (-8.760, 4.745)
Household size -0.013 -0.018 0.000 -0.125
(-0.031, 0.005) (-0.061, 0.024) (-0.013, 0.013) (-0.563, 0.313)
Divorced/separ./wid. 0.109 0.325 -0.011 3.450
(-0.146, 0.364) (-0.275, 0.926) (-0.184, 0.161) (-0.732, 7.632)
Married/common law 0.178 0.209 0.081 2.712
(0.045, 0.310) (-0.168, 0.586) (-0.026, 0.188) (-0.290, 5.713)
Family income‡ 0.114 0.107 0.014 0.943
(-0.137, 0.366) (-0.448, 0.663) (-0.163, 0.191) (-4.789, 6.674)
Respondent income‡ -0.583 -0.307 -0.316 -2.521
(-1.327, 0.160) (-2.124, 1.511) (-0.694, 0.061) (-15.573, 10.532)
Employed 0.058 -0.256 0.095 -0.361
(-0.050, 0.165) (-0.822, 0.310) (0.016, 0.173) (-2.510, 1.788)
Unemployed -0.086 -0.057 -0.040** -3.099*
(-0.272, 0.099) (-0.411, 0.298) (-0.148, 0.068) (-5.958, -0.239)
Trad. language 0.052 0.301 0.006 1.619
(-0.054, 0.158) (-0.074, 0.677) (-0.041, 0.054) (-0.752, 3.990)
Attending school -0.104 -0.588 0.044 -0.537
(-0.278, 0.069) (-1.247, 0.071) (-0.069, 0.158) (-3.721, 2.646)
First stage excluded
High school grad. -0.231* 0.088 -0.293*
(-0.450, -0.012) (-0.170, 0.345) (-0.551, -0.035)
Com. problem index -0.102 0.215** 4.096***
(-0.239, 0.034) (0.175, 0.254) (1.666, 6.526)
Observations 17,220 9,220 17,220 17,220
First stage F-stat 3.00 1.22 5.36 7.69
First stage partial R2 3.19 3.10 8.09 5.89
Hansen’s J (p-value) — 0.86 0.20 —
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***,**,* Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 90% confidence intervals, based on robust standard
errors adjusted for community level clustering, are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include
community fixed effects and year effects. Family income is net of respondent’s income. Cigarette prices
reflect the point-of-sale price of 200 cigarettes for Status Indians purchasing on reserve. Nominal monetary
variables are adjusted using the provincial consumer price index (2001 dollars.)
†90% CH bounds, robust to weak instruments, reported in braces.
‡Income variables in 100,000 dollar values.
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Table 6: Sensitivity analysis for structural equation estimates
Smoking Occasional Daily Cigarettes
participation smoking smoking per. day
A
log(Cigarette prices) -.079* -0.148 -0.048** -1.122*
(-0.155, -0.003) (-0.327, 0.031) (-0.085, -0.012) (-2.094, -0.149)
Com. smoking† 0.484 -0.269 0.744*** 0.871***
(-0.007, 0.976) (-2.468, 1.930) (0.500, 0.987) (0.449, 1.293)
{-0.410, 0.969} {-4.000, 1.080} {0.090, 0.960} {0.185, 1.335}
Com. obese -0.032 0.171 -0.093* -0.359
(-0.160, 0.097) (-0.198, 0.541) (-0.177, -0.009) (-2.727, 2.008)
Com. diabetes 0.365*** -0.531 0.224* 1.483
(0.099, 0.632) (-0.531, 0.655) (0.023, 0.424) (-6.663, 3.696)
First stage excluded
High school grad. -0.228* 0.094 -0.299* —
(-0.440, -0.016) (-0.123, 0.311) (-0.549, -0.0480)
Com. problem index — -0.094 0.187* 3.884**
(-0.207, 0.019) (0.024, 0.350) (1.326, 6.443)
Observations 17,220 9,220 17,220 17,220
First stage F-stat 3.12 1.18 4.53 6.24
First stage partial R2 3.21 2.86 7.31 5.25
Hansen’s J (p-value) — 0.88 0.32 —
B
log(Cigarette prices) -0.055** -0.073* -0.032 -0.813
(-0.093, -0.018) ( -0.137, -0.009) (-0.066, 0.002 ) (-1.796, 0.170)
Com. smoking† 0.425** 0.590 0.655*** 0.676***
(0.146, 0.704) ( -0.427, 1.608) (0.370, 0.940) (0.252, 1.010)
{-0.020, 0.660} { -4.000, 1.360 } {0.010, 0.860 } {-0.120, 1.060 }
First stage excluded
High school grad. -0.359*** -0.056 -0.313** —
(-0.546, -0.171) (-0.254, 0.142) ( -0.516, -0.109)
Com. problem index — -0.117* 0.167* 3.925**
(-0.232, -0.003) (0.021, 0.314) (1.416, 6.434)
Observations 17,220 9,220 17,220 17,220
First stage F-stat 9.90 1.71 5.04 6.62
First stage partial R2 9.98 4.52 7.90 5.70
Hansen’s J (p-value) — 0.63 0.32 —
C
log(Cigarette prices) -0.073* -0.120 -0.045* -1.078*
(-0.137, -0.009) (-0.289, 0.050) (-0.084, -0.007) (-2.074, -0.083)
Com. smoking† 0.464** -0.121 0.764*** 0.783**
(0.092, 0.837) (-2.300, 2.058) (0.529, 0.999) (0.372, 1.193)
{-0.360, 0.760} {-4.000, 1.225} {0.330, 0.920} {0.015, 1.155}
First stage excluded
High school grad. -0.296** 0.060 -0.311** —
(-0.491, -0.101) (-0.145, 0.265) (-0.565, -0.056)
Com. problem index — -0.-0.085 0.200** 4.096**
(-0.189, 0.018) (0.046, 0.355) (1.505, 6.686)
Observations 17,220 9,220 17,220 17,220
First stage F-stat 6.23 1.04 5.97 7.77
First stage partial R2 5.48 2.14 8.35 5.91
Hansen’s J (p-value) — 0.71 0.17 —
***,**,* Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 90% confidence intervals, based on robust standard
errors adjusted for community level clustering, are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include
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community fixed effects and year effects. Family income is net of respondent’s income. Cigarette prices
reflect the point-of-sale price of 200 cigarettes for Status Indians purchasing on reserve. Nominal monetary
variables are adjusted using the provincial consumer price index (2001 dollars.)
Regressions include the following community means as included and excluded instruments:
A: (included) standard deviation of community income, age distribution, proportion males, household size,
marital status, income, employment, speaks a traditional language, attending school, doctor diagnosed
diabetes, obesity rate; (excluded) high school graduation, community problem index;
B: (included) standard deviation of community income, speaks a traditional language; (excluded) high
school graduation, community problem index;
C: (included) standard deviation of community income, age distribution, marital status, employment (for
occasional and daily only), speaks a traditional language, attending school; (excluded) high school
graduation, community problem index.
†90% CH bounds, robust to weak instruments, reported in braces.
36
Figure 1: Sensitivity of the structural estimates test to relaxing the exclusion restrictions
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(a) Smoking participation: Endogenous social effects
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(b) Smoking participation: Direct price effect
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(c) Occasional smoking: Endogenous social effects
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Contextual effect for high school graduation rate
(d) Occasional smoking: Direct price effect
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Contextual effect for high school graduation rate
(e) Daily smoking: Endogenous social effects
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(f) Daily smoking: Direct price effect
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(g) Cigarettes per day: Endogenous social effects
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Contextual effect for community problem index (average)
(h) Cigarettes per day: Direct price effect
Horizontal axis includes values of θ0 and vertical access includes corresponding estimates for α and η. Solid
line represents point estimates, large dashed lines represent 90% robust asymptotic confidence intervals,
small dashed line represents 90% CH bounds (minimum bound of -4).37
Appendix: Communities included in analysis
Census Community Province Population School Health Police Recreation Fire
Subdivision Name (2001) Center Center
1003801 Samiajij Miawpukek NF 837 yes yes yes yes yes
1103035 Lennox Island 1 PEI 261 yes yes yes yes yes
1208014 Indian Brook 14 NS 932 yes yes yes yes yes
1210003 Millbrook 27 NS 821 yes yes yes yes yes
1217020 Eskasoni 3 NS 2741 yes yes yes yes yes
1310034 Devon 30 NB 692 yes yes no yes no
2499804 Mistissini PQ 3125 no no no no no
2499806 Waskaganish PQ 1699 no yes yes no no
2499814 Chisasibi PQ 3467 no no yes no no
3543050 Mnjikaning F.N. 32 ON 597 yes yes yes yes no
3543069 Christian Island 30 ON 515 yes yes yes yes yes
3558003 Fort William 52 ON 599 no yes yes yes no
3559063 Couchiching 16A ON 595 no yes yes yes yes
3560053 Fort Hope 64 ON 1001 yes yes yes yes yes
3560070 Deer Lake ON 756 yes yes yes no no
3560071 Sandy Lake 88 ON 1704 yes yes yes yes yes
4606040 Sioux Valley 58 MB 1050 yes yes yes yes yes
4608069 Sandy Bay 5 MB 2446 yes yes yes yes yes
4616017 Waywayseecappo F.N. MB 1135 yes yes yes yes yes
4617029 Ebb and Flow 52 MB 991 yes yes no yes yes
4618067 Fairford 50 MB 820 yes yes no yes yes
4619056 Fisher River 44 MB 867 yes yes no yes yes
4621029 Chemawawin 2 MB 964 yes yes yes yes yes
4621043 Opaskwayak Cree Nation 21E MB 2025 yes - - - -
4622050 Oxford House 24 MB 1700 yes yes no yes yes
4622051 Cross Lake 19 MB 1491 yes yes no yes no
4622052 Cross Lake 19A MB 502 - - - - -
4622058 Norway House 17 MB 3950 no yes yes yes yes
4622059 Nelson House 170 MB 1710 yes yes yes yes yes
4622063 Split Lake 171 MB 1581 yes yes no yes yes
4701808 White Bear 70 SK 536 yes yes yes yes yes
4705803 Cowessess 73 SK 486 yes yes yes yes yes
4706809 Piapot 75 SK 503 yes yes no yes no
4706810 Assiniboine 76 SK 646 yes yes yes yes yes
4706811 Standing Buffalo 78 SK 454 yes yes yes no yes
4706816 Peepeekisis 81 SK 396 yes yes no yes no
4710823 Gordon 86 SK 723 yes yes yes yes yes
4712830 Mosquito 109 SK 433 yes yes no yes no
4713835 Poundmaker 114 SK 505 yes yes yes yes yes
Continued on next page
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Census Community Province Population School Health Police Recreation Fire
Subdivision Name (2001) Center Center
4713836 Little Pine 116 SK 567 yes yes no yes yes
4715849 James Smith 100 SK 624 yes yes no yes yes
4715853 Montreal Lake 106B SK 347 - - - - -
4716856 Sturgeon Lake 101 SK 873 yes yes yes yes yes
4716858 Big River 118 SK 1225 yes yes no yes yes
4716860 Ahtahkakoop 104 SK 1099 yes yes yes yes yes
4717801 Seekaskootch 119 SK 1834 yes yes yes yes yes
4717802 Makaoo (Part) 120 SK 175 - - - - -
4717805 Flying Dust F.N. 105 SK 575 yes yes yes yes no
4717806 Waterhen 130 SK 577 yes yes yes yes yes
4717807 Makwa Lake 129B SK 736 - - - - -
4717809 Ministikwan 161 SK 573 yes yes no yes yes
4717812 Moosomin 112B SK 514 yes yes yes yes yes
4718802 Montreal Lake 106 SK 861 yes yes yes yes yes
4718809 Lac La Ronge 156 SK 1181 - - - - -
4718812 Kitsakie 156B SK 560 - - - - -
4718814 Wapachewunak 192D SK 434 yes yes yes yes yes
4718817 Canoe Lake 165 SK 747 yes yes yes yes yes
4718818 Buffalo River Dene Nation 193 SK 607 yes yes yes yes yes
4718828 Chicken 224 SK 1075 yes yes yes yes yes
4718839 Clearwater River SK 548 yes yes no yes yes
4803801 Peigan 147 AB - yes yes no yes yes
4803802 Blood 148 AB 3852 yes yes yes yes yes
4805802 Siksika 146 AB 2750 yes yes yes yes yes
4806804 Tsuu T’ina Nation 145 AB - - - - - -
4810805 Makaoo (Part) 120 AB 175 - - - - -
4811803 Louis Bull 138B AB 892 yes yes yes yes yes
4811804 Stony Plain 135 AB 1100 yes yes no yes yes
4815802 Stoney 142, 143, 144 AB 2173 yes yes no yes yes
4817819 Wabasca 166A AB 510 - - - - -
4817823 Wabasca 166D AB 860 yes no no no no
4817824 Utikoomak Lake 155 AB 812 yes yes yes no yes
4817837 John d’Or Prairie 215 AB 851 - - - - -
5909832 Seabird Island BC 535 yes yes no yes yes
5909839 Chehalis 5 BC 460 yes yes no no yes
5915803 Musqueam 2 BC 1305 yes yes no yes no
5915807 Mission 1 BC 550 no no no yes no
5915808 Capilano 5 BC 2230 - - - - -
5919804 Chemainus 13 BC 557 yes yes no yes no
5919807 Cowichan 1 BC 1201 yes yes no yes no
5923816 Tsahaheh 1 BC 322 yes yes no yes no
5929803 Sechelt (Part) BC - no yes no no no
5933880 Kamloops 1 BC 1410 yes yes yes yes no
5937801 Okanagan (Part) 1 BC 95 no yes no yes yes
5941801 Alkali Lake 1 BC 396 yes yes yes yes yes
5941812 Williams Lake 1 BC 273 no yes no yes yes
5943801 Alert Bay 1 BC 281 - - - - -
5943802 Alert Bay 1A BC 411 yes yes no yes no
5943806 Tsulquate 4 BC 387 no no yes no no
5949803 Kitamaat 2 BC 511 yes yes yes yes yes
5949811 Hagwilget 1 BC 237 no yes no yes yes
5949812 Gitanmaax 1 BC 693 yes yes no yes yes
5949814 Gitsegukla 1 BC 432 yes yes no yes yes
5949816 Gitwangak 1 BC 475 yes yes no yes yes
5955801 East Moberly Lake 169 BC 330 yes yes no no no
5959806 Fort Nelson 2 BC 390 yes yes yes yes no
Community facility information and population sizes found at Aboriginal Canada Portal :
http://www.aboriginalcanada.gc.ca/acp/site.nsf/eng/index.html. F.N. stands for First Nation.
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